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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Kaley v. United States1 is the type of case that can inspire intense 
passions. It presents a deceptively simple question: Should the 
government, on the basis of a grand jury’s finding of probable cause, 
be permitted to restrict the defendant’s use of assets she has set aside 
to retain counsel for her defense? Or, framed from the other side, is a 
defendant who needs potentially forfeitable assets to retain counsel of 
choice entitled, under the Due Process Clause, to a hearing at which 
she can challenge the grand jury’s finding of probable cause? This 
question pits two longstanding constitutional doctrines against one 
another: the right to retain counsel of choice and the principle that a 
grand jury indictment is immune to challenge. 
The backstory of Kaley v. United States reads like something out of 
a civil libertarian’s nightmare. A victimless crime, overzealous 
prosecutors, vindictive use of asset forfeiture, and deprivation of the 
right to counsel of choice all play starring roles. The full might of the 
federal government is on display—proposing a showdown by accusing 
defendants of a crime and then stripping them of the means to 
employ their chosen advocate before the battle has even begun. The 
old adage that “[g]reat cases, like hard cases, make bad law,”2 however, 
counsels caution. As Justice Sotomayor noted, this case might be “one 
in a million.”3 The hearing that seems appropriate and just in the 
Kaleys’ circumstance might serve only to delay and distract in the vast 
 
 J.D. Candidate, 2015, Duke University School of Law. 
 1.  Kaley v. United States, No. 12-464 (U.S. argued Oct. 16, 2013). 
 2.  Northern Secs. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 364 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 3.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Kaley v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1580 (2013) (No. 
12-464). 
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majority of cases without making any difference as to the restraints 
ultimately placed on the defendant’s assets. 
II.  FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Kerri Kaley received notice in early 2005 that she was the subject 
of a grand jury investigation in the Southern District of Florida.4 
Kaley, a sales representative for prescription medical device (PMD) 
distributor Ethicon Endo-Surgery (Ethicon), was accused of stealing 
PMDs from hospitals and re-selling them on the black market.5 Kerri 
and her husband Brian, who was also under investigation, maintained 
that the PMDs they sold were old, unwanted models that hospitals 
had voluntarily given to them.6 Kerri and Brian retained separate 
counsel.7 To secure the funds to pay counsel through trial, the Kaleys 
obtained a $500,000 home equity line of credit on their home, which 
they used to purchase a certificate of deposit (CD).8 
In February 2007, the grand jury returned a seven-count 
indictment, including one count of conspiracy to transport PMDs in 
interstate commerce while knowing them to be stolen, five 
substantive counts of transporting stolen property, and one count of 
obstruction of justice.9 Under 21 U.S.C. § 853, the Government sought 
criminal forfeiture of all assets deemed traceable to the substantive 
offenses.10 Later, the Government obtained a superseding indictment 
that added a money laundering count.11 Under the new indictment, 
the Government sought criminal forfeiture of the Kaleys’ home on 
the theory that it was “involved with” the money laundering offense.12 
The magistrate judge granted a protective order to restrict all the 
assets subject to forfeiture, including the CD.13 The Kaleys requested a 
“pretrial, post-restraint evidentiary hearing” to challenge the 
restrictions on their property.14 The magistrate judge denied this 
request, finding that no hearing was necessary until trial.15 After the 
 
 4.  United States v. Kaley (Kaley I), 579 F.3d 1246, 1249 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Brief for Petitioner at 8–10, Kaley v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1580 (2013) (No. 12-462).  
 7.  Kaley I, 579 F.3d at 1249. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. at 1249–50. 
 10.  Id. at 1250. 
 11.  Id. at 1250–51. 
 12.  Id. at 1251. 
 13.  Id.  
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
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district judge affirmed that decision, the Kaleys lodged an 
interlocutory appeal.16 
In the first of the Kaleys’ two appeals (Kaley I), a panel of the 
Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court and remanded the case for 
a more searching analysis of the Kaleys’ request for an adversarial 
hearing.17 The panel found that the district court had (1) failed to 
properly assess the scope of the hearing and (2) had not fully 
considered the prejudice the Kaleys might suffer as a result of the 
asset restraint.18 On remand, the district court held a hearing at which 
it allowed the Kaleys to contest the traceability of the assets in 
question to the underlying crime, but did not permit them to 
challenge the basis for the charges themselves.19 The Kaleys did not 
attempt to challenge traceability.20 Instead, they maintained that while 
the assets were traceable to the conduct alleged in the indictment, the 
conduct itself was not unlawful.21 They argued that only a hearing in 
which they could contest probable cause would satisfy the demands of 
due process. After the district court refused to permit such a hearing, 
the Kaleys lodged a second interlocutory appeal.22 
While the Kaleys’ case was up on appeal, the Government 
proceeded with the trial of the Kaleys’ former co-defendant, Jennifer 
Gruenstrass.23 Gruenstrass’s argument at trial was that hospitals had 
voluntarily given unwanted, old-model PMDs to her and the Kaleys.24 
After the Government failed to produce any witnesses from the 
hospitals or from Ethicon that would testify to being victims of theft, 
the jury acquitted Gruenstrass of all charges.25 
 
 
 
 16.  Id. at 1251–52. 
 17.  Id. at 1259–60. 
 18.  Id. at 1257–58. 
 19.  United States v. Kaley (Kaley II), 677 F.3d 1316, 1320 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 
133 S. Ct. 1580 (Mar. 18, 2013). 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id.  
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 18. 
 24.  Id. at 18–20. 
 25.  Id. at 21. 
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Right to Counsel of Choice 
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution affords criminal 
defendants the right to assistance of counsel.26 Long before the 
Supreme Court decided that indigent defendants had a right to 
government-appointed counsel,27 the Sixth Amendment guaranteed a 
defendant the right to secure counsel he could afford or who was 
willing to represent her without being compensated.28 This right, 
however, has always been qualified. Limitations include rules 
governing admission to practice in the relevant court, conflicts of 
interest, and the caseload of the desired attorney.29 
The right to counsel of choice is independent from the right to 
effective assistance of counsel.30 The right to effective assistance of 
counsel is part of the broader purpose of the Sixth Amendment to 
ensure a fair trial.31 A violation of the right to effective assistance of 
counsel, then, is complete only if the violation resulted in a 
substantively unfair trial.32 In contrast, a violation of the right to 
counsel of choice is complete as soon as the defendant is erroneously 
prevented from being represented by her chosen counsel.33 Because it 
is the defendant’s choice that the right protects, the court’s opinion of 
the relative effectiveness of counsel is irrelevant.34 
 
 
 
 
 26.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 27.  See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 
458 (1938). 
 28.  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States (Caplin & Drysdale), 491 U.S. 617, 
624–25 (1989); see also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932) (“It is hardly necessary to say 
that the right to counsel being conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to 
secure counsel of his own choice.”). 
 29.  United States v. Gonzales-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 154 (2006) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“A 
defendant's right to have the assistance of counsel necessarily meant the right to have the 
assistance of whatever counsel the defendant was able to secure. But from the beginning, the 
right to counsel of choice has been circumscribed.”).  
 30.  Id. at 146–48.  
 31.  Id. at 147. 
 32.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984). 
 33.  Id. at 146. 
 34.  Id. at 148. 
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B.  Asset Forfeiture and the Right to Counsel of Choice 
Here, the Government seeks criminal asset forfeiture under 21 
U.S.C. § 853, which provides for forfeiture of property earned from, 
used in, or related to criminal activities.35 The statute establishes the 
“relation back” theory that property vests in the government as soon 
as it is used in the commission of a crime.36 In order to preserve assets 
for forfeiture, a court “may” issue a restraining order based on a 
grand jury indictment.37 As a general matter, criminal asset forfeiture 
has been held constitutional, even for assets needed to retain or repay 
counsel.38 The remaining controversy surrounds whether due process 
requires a hearing before the court continues to restrain assets the 
defendant needs to retain counsel of choice.39 
1.  The Grand Jury’s Role in Determining Probable Cause 
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides that a person 
may be “held to answer” for a felony charge upon indictment by a 
grand jury.40 The grand jury determines, based on evidence presented 
by a prosecutor, whether there is probable cause to indict the 
defendant.41 The defendant has no right to be assisted by counsel 
before the grand jury.42 At the proceeding, the prosecutor may present 
hearsay and other forms of evidence that would be inadmissible at 
trial43 and the prosecutor has no duty to present exculpatory 
evidence.44 A line of Supreme Court cases beginning with Costello v. 
United States45 indicates that courts should “abstain from reviewing 
the evidentiary support for the grand jury’s judgment”46 and respect 
 
 35.  21 U.S.C.A. § 853(a) (West 2013). 
 36.  Id. § 853(c). 
 37.  Id. § 853(e)(1). 
 38.  See Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 624–25. 
 39.  Kaley II, 677 F.3d 1316, 1328–29 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 1580 (Mar. 
18, 2013). 
 40.  U.S. CONST. amend. V.; see Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 187 (1958) (holding 
that “infamous” crimes for purposes of the Sixth Amendment are those that carry a potential 
penalty of incarceration for one year or more), overruled on other grounds by Bloom v. Illinois, 
391 U.S. 194 (1968). 
 41.  United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51 (1992). 
 42.  United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976). 
 43.  Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1962) (“An indictment returned by a 
legally constituted and unbiased grand jury . . . if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of 
the charge on the merits.”). 
 44.  Williams, 504 U.S. at 55. 
 45.  350 U.S. 359 (1962). 
 46.  Williams, 504 U.S. at 54. 
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its important role as an independent body.47 Circuit courts disagree, 
however, over whether this line of cases indicates that the grand jury’s 
finding of probable cause is conclusive as to all pretrial matters.48 
2.  Bail Hearings: Challenging the Grand Jury’s Probable Cause 
Determination? 
Bail hearings may constitute an exception to the general 
proposition that judges do not reconsider probable cause after the 
grand jury has issued an indictment.49 Before a judge may refuse to 
release a defendant on bail due to concerns about the safety of the 
community, the Bail Reform Act requires an adversarial hearing at 
which the judge examines, among other things, the weight of the 
evidence for the underlying indictment.50 In United States v. Salerno,51 
the Supreme Court determined that pretrial detention did not violate 
due process because (1) Congress had a legitimate and compelling 
regulatory purpose52 and (2) the Act offered defendants significant 
procedural protections.53 
3. Modern Decisions on Asset Forfeiture and the Right to 
Counsel 
a.  Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto III 
On the same day in June 1989, the Supreme Court decided a pair 
of cases addressing the interaction of criminal asset forfeiture and the 
right to counsel of choice.54 Read together, the two cases, Caplin & 
 
 47.  United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974). 
 48.  See Kaley II, 677 F.3d 1316, 1323–24 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting a circuit split as to 
whether the grand jury indictment conclusively establishes probable cause for the purpose of 
asset forfeiture when the right to counsel of choice is at stake), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 1580 
(Mar. 18, 2013); United States v. Monsanto (Monsanto IV), 924 F.2d 1186, 1196 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(“[W]e do not read these cases as precluding a reconsideration of probable cause as to the 
defendant's commission [of the crimes giving rise to forfeiture] in a pretrial hearing.”). 
 49.  See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-de la Cruz, 431 F. Supp. 2d 200, 203 (D.P.R. 2006) 
(“Even though a grand jury has found probable cause to believe [defendant is] guilty of a crime 
of violence, the evidence currently before the Court does not support a finding that no condition 
or combination of conditions would reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the 
community.”). 
 50.  18 U.S.C.A. § 3141(g) (West 2013). 
 51.  481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
 52.  Id. at 747. 
 53.  Id. at 750. 
 54.  Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. 617 (1989); United States v. Monsanto (Monsanto III), 
491 U.S. 600 (1989). Monsanto III arrived at the Supreme Court after a panel decision 
(Monsanto I) and an en banc decision (Monsanto II) at the Second Circuit.  On remand from 
the Supreme Court decision (Monsanto III), the Second Circuit decided Monsanto IV,  
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Drysdale, Chartered v. United States55 and Monsanto III,56 hold that the 
government may restrain funds subject to forfeiture before trial based 
on a finding of probable cause, even if a defendant demonstrates that 
the funds are needed to retain counsel of choice. Monsanto III, 
however, explicitly leaves open whether due process requires the 
court to hold a hearing before imposing pretrial asset restraint.57 
In Caplin & Drysdale the Court rejected a counsel-of-choice 
based challenge to 21 U.S.C. § 853.58 Caplin & Drysdale involved a 
defendant who had already pleaded guilty to drug importation 
charges and sought to use funds to pay attorney’s fees he had 
previously incurred.59 The Court held, “[a] defendant has no Sixth 
Amendment right to spend another person’s money for services 
rendered by an attorney, even if those funds are the only way that that 
defendant will be able to retain the attorney of h[er] choice.”60 The 
Court also noted that there was nothing unique about asset 
forfeiture’s interference with the right to counsel.61 After all, the right 
to practice one’s religion, to speak, or to travel may all be limited by a 
defendant’s lack of financial resources.62 
Because Monsanto III involved the restriction of a defendant’s 
assets before trial and before any plea had been entered, it presented 
distinct issues.63 There, the Court read Caplin & Drysdale to indicate 
that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments provide no general bar against 
seizing funds needed to retain counsel of choice based on a finding of 
probable cause.64 The Court explicitly declined to decide an issue that 
was already dividing the circuits: “whether the Due Process Clause 
requires a hearing before a pretrial restraining order can be 
imposed.”65 
 
 
discussed below. 
 55.  491 U.S. 617 (1989). 
 56.  491 U.S. 600 (1989).  
 57.  Monsanto III, 491 U.S. at 615 n.10. 
 58.  Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 619. 
 59.  Id. at 621; Monsanto IV, 924 F.2d 1186, 1190 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 60.  Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 626.  
 61.  Id. at 628. 
 62.  Id.  
 63.  Monsanto III, 491 U.S. at 615 & n.10. 
 64.  Id. at 614. 
 65.  Id. at 615 n.10. 
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b.  Monsanto IV 
On remand, the Second Circuit took up the question the Supreme 
Court left open in Monsanto III.66 The Second Circuit split the central 
question into two parts: (1) does the Due Process Clause require a 
pretrial, post-restraint hearing? and (2) if so, what is the proper scope 
of the hearing?67 
To answer these questions, the Second Circuit applied the 
framework established in Mathews v. Eldridge.68 The Mathews test 
invites courts to consider the interests on both sides of the suit in 
determining what procedures due process requires when a party 
stands to lose a property interest.69 The test accounts for the following 
three factors: (1) the private interest affected by the government 
action, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest through 
the current procedures and the likely value of additional procedural 
safeguards, and (3) the government’s interest, including the additional 
burdens of the proposed procedure.70 After considering the Mathews 
test, the Second Circuit held that the factors weighed decidedly in 
favor of permitting a post-restraint hearing at which the defendant 
could challenge the finding of probable cause for the underlying 
indictment.71 
Today, a majority of circuits that have considered the matter have 
agreed with the Second Circuit and permitted the type of hearing the 
Kaleys seek.72 A minority holds that such a hearing must be limited to 
traceability—whether the assets are traceable to the underlying crime 
in the indictment—and may not address probable cause.73 After Kaley 
II, the Eleventh Circuit is among the circuits that limit the pretrial 
 
 66.  Monsanto IV, 924 F.2d 1186, 1188 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 67.  Id. at 1203. 
 68.  Id. at 1193; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 69.  See Monsanto IV, 924 F.2d at 1192–93 (applying the Matthews balancing test to assess 
the private and governmental interests at stake when the government sought pretrial asset 
restraint, which constituted a “deprivation of property subject to the constraints of due process” 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 
6, at 34 (collecting cases in which the Supreme Court applied the Matthews test to a variety of 
due process challenges to government procedures, including property rights cases). 
 70.  Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
 71.  Monsanto IV, 924 F.2d at 1196. 
 72.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 23, Kaley v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1580 (2013) (No. 
12-464). 
 73.  Id. The Second, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C Circuits allow for an adversarial 
hearing addressing both probable cause and traceability. The Tenth, Sixth, and Eleventh 
Circuits allow for a hearing limited to traceability.  The Fifth, Third, and Eighth circuits have 
not addressed the issue since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Monsanto III.   
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hearing to traceability.74 
4. The Medina Test 
If the Supreme Court declines to apply the Mathews test, it may 
look to the test developed in Medina v. California.75 Medina involved 
a due process challenge to a California state rule about the burden of 
proof for demonstrating incompetency to stand trial.76 There, the 
Court declined to use Mathews to assess a state rule of criminal 
procedure. Instead, the Court, drawing upon Patterson v. New York,77 
held that a state rule of criminal procedure is prescribed by the Due 
Process Clause only if it contravenes a principle of justice so deeply 
rooted that it is viewed as fundamental.78 The Court reasoned that 
explicit provisions of criminal procedure enumerated in the Bill of 
Rights embody the Constitution’s careful balancing of liberty and 
order.79 Judicial expansion of constitutional guarantees under the 
“open ended rubric of the Due Process Clause” threatens to upset 
that balance.80 Though the parties in this case dispute whether 
federalism concerns were essential to the holding in Medina,81 no 
Supreme Court case to date has applied the Medina test to federal 
rules of criminal procedure. 
IV. HOLDING 
Having determined in Kaley I that due process demanded a 
pretrial hearing, the issue before the Eleventh Circuit in Kaley II was 
the scope of that hearing.82 The court held that the district court was 
correct to limit the scope of the hearing to traceability and to prohibit 
the Kaleys from challenging probable cause as to the underlying 
crimes in the indictment.83 
 
 
 74.  Kaley II, 677 F.3d 1316, 1323 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 1580 (Mar. 18, 
2013). 
 75.  505 U.S. 437 (1992). 
 76.  Id. at 439. 
 77.  432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
 78.  Medina, 505 U.S. at 443–46. 
 79.  Id. at 443. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Brief for the United States at 18, United States v. Kaley, 133 S. Ct. 1580 (2013) (No. 
12-462); Reply Brief for Petitioners at 1–2, Kaley, 133 S. Ct. 1580 (No. 12-462). 
 82.  Kaley II, 677 F.3d 1316, 1317 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 1580 (Mar. 18, 
2013). 
 83.  Id. 
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The court found that 21 U.S.C. § 853 clearly states that, based on a 
grand jury indictment, assets subject to forfeiture may be restrained 
without further proceedings.84 As a result, the case presented the 
constitutional question of whether due process itself requires a 
hearing.85 
Due process, the court determined, requires a hearing on the 
traceability of the assets to the alleged crime, but does not permit 
defendants to challenge the grand jury’s finding of probable cause.86 
Relying heavily on Costello and its progeny, the court held that 
allowing a hearing on the merits of the indictment would run counter 
to the weight of precedent evincing a “powerful reluctance to allow 
pretrial challenges to the evidentiary support for an indictment,” 
while adding nothing to the ultimate guarantee of a fair trial.87 
Because the grand jury is an independent institution long seen as a 
bulwark against oppressive or arbitrary prosecution, defendants have 
no right to challenge the sufficiency of its probable cause findings.88 
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the hearing proposed by the 
Kaleys would amount to a type of mini-trial that would pose a direct 
challenge to the grand jury.89 The district court, then, was correct to 
prohibit the Kaleys from challenging the grand jury’s finding that they 
had violated federal laws against theft and money laundering.90 
V. ARGUMENTS 
A.  The Kaleys’ Argument 
The Kaleys’ central argument is that when property essential to 
retain counsel of choice is at stake, the ex parte grand jury proceeding 
does not satisfy the central tenet of due process: the opportunity to be 
heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”91 Instead, 
due process requires a pretrial adversarial hearing at which the 
defendant may challenge the grounds for asset restraint.92 The 
Mathews test, which provides the proper framework for assessing the 
 
 84.  Id. at 1321. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. at 1323. 
 87.  Id. at 1325. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. at 1326. 
 90.  Id. at 1326–28. 
 91.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 30. 
 92.  Id. at 32. 
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demands of due process in this context, calls for an adversarial 
hearing in the Kaleys’ case.93 
1.  Mathews Test Analysis 
a. The Kaleys’ Private Interests 
The Kaleys argue that the private interest at stake—the ability to 
use their property to retain counsel of choice—is significant.94 For the 
right to counsel of choice to be of consequence, it must be exercised 
during the relevant window of opportunity.95 Although delaying the 
due process hearing until trial would only temporarily deprive the 
Kaleys of their property, it would “completely eviscerate their right to 
counsel of choice.”96 
The Kaleys argue that because they have a significant property 
interest at stake, the Supreme Court should apply the Mathews test to 
determine the procedures to which they are entitled under the Due 
Process Clause.97 The Court, applying the Mathews test, has repeatedly 
held that due process requires an adversarial hearing in civil 
attachment and forfeiture cases.98 Unlike parties to civil suits, the 
Kaleys stand to lose not only property but also liberty. 99 Because, for 
the Kaleys, “[t]he stakes could not be much higher,” they are entitled 
to at least as much process as civil defendants in forfeiture cases.100  
b.  The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation 
Further, the Kaleys argue that the risk of erroneous deprivation is 
significant because the Government has a direct pecuniary interest in 
the result of the proceeding.101 As the Court has noted, it makes sense 
for the judiciary to provide closer scrutiny of government action when 
 
 93.  Id. at 33. 
 94.  Id. at 52–54. 
 95.  Id. at 54. 
 96.  Id. at 53–54 (quoting Kaley I, 579 F.3d 1246, 1266 (11th Cir. 2009) (Tjoflat, J., 
concurring)). 
 97.  Id. at 33. 
 98.  Id. at 54.  The Kaleys’ brief discusses six civil attachment and forfeiture cases in detail: 
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993); Connecticut v. Doehr, 
501 U.S. 1 (1991); N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. 
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. 
Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969). See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 36–46. 
 99.  Id. at 55. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 51–52. 
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the government stands to profit from the result.102 
In United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property (Good),103 the 
Court cited a 1990 memorandum that the Attorney General 
distributed to all United States Attorneys admonishing them to 
significantly increase “the volume of forfeitures in order to meet the 
Department of Justice’s annual budget target.”104 Since then, United 
States Attorneys have dutifully heeded that admonition and asset 
forfeiture funds have increased dramatically.105 The possibility that a 
prosecutor’s judgment may be clouded by the prospect of institutional 
gain necessitates proper procedural safeguards.106 
The Kaleys further argue that, although the grand jury serves a 
constitutional role as a “shield against . . . unfounded charges,” it 
should not be transformed into a sword to undercut the defendant’s 
ability to fight those charges.107 Though formally independent, the 
grand jury often functions as the “handmaiden of the prosecution.”108 
There, the accused has no right to testify and the prosecution has no 
obligation to present exculpatory evidence.109 Such a proceeding does 
not sufficiently mitigate the risk of erroneous deprivation of property 
needed to exercise the right to counsel of choice.110 
c.  The Government’s Interest 
The Kaleys argue that the Government’s interests are relatively 
minor. Presently, the Government has no property interest in the 
Kaleys’ CD or home; rather, it has an interest in the potential future 
divestment of that property.111 
 
 102.  James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. at 56; see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 
U.S. 957, 979 n.9 (1991) (“[I]t makes sense to scrutinize governmental action more closely when 
the State stands to benefit.”). 
 103.  510 U.S. 43 (1993). 
 104.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 56 (citation omitted). 
 105.  Id. (“In the 22 years from 1989 to 2010, an estimated $12.6 billion in assets was seized 
by U.S. Attorneys in asset forfeiture cases.” (citing Brief of the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae 
at 11 & nn.3–4, United States v. Kaley, 133 S. Ct. 1580 (2013) (No. 12-462))). 
 106.  Id.  See also Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 250 (1980); United States v. Funds 
Held ex rel. Wetterer, 210 F.3d 96, 110 (2d Cir. 2000) (observing the “potential for abuse” and 
“corrupting incentives” of a system where the Department of Justice “conceives the jurisdiction 
and ground for seizures, . . . executes them, [and] also absorbs their proceeds”).  
 107.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 56. 
 108.  Id. at 58 (quoting Niki Kuckes, The Useful, Dangerous Fiction of Grand Jury 
Independence, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 2 (Winter 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 109.  Id. at 56. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
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The Government’s interest in not revealing its case prior to trial 
does not weigh heavily.112 Even prior to trial, the Government must 
comply with significant disclosure requirements in discovery. This is 
an interest, then, of limited duration—it amounts to a question of 
when the Government will need to disclose its evidence or trial 
strategy.113 In addition, prosecutors can always elect not to seek pre-
conviction asset restraint in any case where the burden is too great.114 
The due process inquiry embodied in the Mathews factors thus weighs 
in favor of granting the Kaleys a pretrial hearing at which they may 
challenge the underlying indictment.115 
B.  The Government’s Argument 
The Government’s primary argument is syllogistic: The grand 
jury’s indictment is conclusive as to probable cause; probable cause is 
sufficient to restrain assets, including assets needed to retain counsel 
of choice; thus, the Kaleys are not entitled to additional, post-
indictment proceedings to challenge probable cause for restraining 
their assets.116 The Government argues that, in analyzing this question, 
the court should employ the Medina test, not the Mathews test. 
Because “[t]he inviolability of the grand jury’s determination of 
probable cause is itself a deeply rooted principle of American justice,” 
the Kaleys claim fails the Medina test.117 In the alternative, the 
Government argues that the Kaleys overestimate their own interest 
while understating the Government’s, and that they would not be 
entitled to any additional process even if the Court applied the 
Mathews test.118 
1.  The Grand Jury Indictment is Dispositive of Probable Cause 
The Government argues that, under long-standing precedent, the 
grand jury’s finding of probable cause is not subject to attack based 
on evidentiary sufficiency, even with the added consideration of the 
right to counsel of choice.119 A grand jury indictment places 
restrictions on a variety of liberty and property interests.120 An 
 
 112.  Id. at 61–62. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at 64. 
 116.  Brief for the United States, supra note 81, at 16–17.   
 117.  Id. at 13. 
 118.  Id. at 14–15. 
 119.  Id. at 20; Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956). 
 120.  Brief for the United States, supra note 81, at 20. 
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indicted defendant can be arrested, held pending trial, suspended 
from her job, or deprived of the right to possess firearms—all without 
any right to an adversarial hearing to contest probable cause.121 If a 
grand jury indictment is sufficient to deprive a defendant of her 
liberty pending trial, it must be sufficient to deprive her of her 
property.122 
Holding a separate hearing to reassess probable cause after a 
grand jury indictment could lead to anomalous and disruptive 
consequences.123 A defendant could be told that, based on the grand 
jury indictment, probable cause that she committed the crime in 
question exists for the purpose of proceeding to trial, but that, based 
on the judge’s independent finding, probable cause that she 
committed the crime does not exist for the purpose of restraining her 
assets.124 This “legal cognitive dissonance” would undermine the 
public’s confidence in criminal proceedings, destabilize the role of the 
grand jury, and “diminish the ‘high place [the grand jury has] held as 
an instrument of justice.”125 
2.  Even Under the Mathews Balancing Test, the Kaleys are Not 
Entitled to Any Additional Process 
a.  The Kaleys Overstate the Interest in Retaining Counsel of 
Choice 
Asset forfeiture does not eviscerate the qualified right to counsel 
of choice; it merely places a limited burden on it.126 The Court has 
acknowledged that this right is circumscribed by a variety of factors, 
including the ongoing legal duty to pay taxes.127 In this case, the Kaleys 
funds are subject to asset forfeiture, which, like taxation, is a policy 
that promotes general public interests.128 Asset forfeiture is not 
designed to interfere with the defendant’s relationship with any 
particular lawyer, though it may have that peripheral effect.129 
 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. at 33–34. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. at 34 (quoting Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956)). 
 126.  Id. at 38 (citing Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. 617, 624–25 (1989)). 
 127.  Id. at 39–40; Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 624–26, 631. 
 128.  Brief for the United States, supra note 81, at 39–40. 
 129.  Id. at 40 (discussing Monsanto III, which held that “a pretrial restraining order” under 
§ 853 “does not ‘arbitrarily’ interfere with a defendant's ‘fair opportunity’ to retain counsel” 
(quoting Monsanto III, 491 U.S. 600, 616 (1989))). 
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Restraining potentially forfeitable assets, then, is not the type of 
arbitrary interference with the right to counsel of choice that the 
Court has prohibited.130 
b.  A Probable Cause Hearing Could Jeopardize Substantial 
Government Interests 
Further, the Government has substantial interests in preserving 
potentially forfeitable assets for full recovery and in avoiding the 
unnecessary risk to witnesses, time, and expense of a hearing that 
would force the Government to prematurely reveal portions of its 
case.131 
Criminal asset forfeiture serves three broad purposes: (1) ensuring 
that “crime does not pay,” thereby deterring crime, punishing criminal 
actors, and weakening the economic power of criminal organizations; 
(2) returning money to victims and to communities; and (3) providing 
financial support for law enforcement activities.132 These important 
purposes give rise to “a strong governmental interest in obtaining full 
recovery of all forfeitable assets.”133 
A pretrial evidentiary hearing would burden the Government 
significantly by diverting scarce prosecutorial resources and by 
forcing premature disclosure of its case and trial strategy.134 Beyond 
putting the prosecution at a disadvantage, premature disclosure could 
put witnesses at risk.135 These burdens could prompt the Government 
to relinquish forfeiture claims even when its concerns have nothing to 
do with the strength of the underlying case.136 Consequently, defense 
counsel could invoke this procedure simply to gain a strategic 
advantage.137 
 
 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. at 40–41 (arguing that “premature disclosure could . . . jeopardize the safety of 
witnesses, including victims and cooperators[,]” particularly in cases involving drug trafficking, 
terrorism, organized crime and political corruption where the risk of witness tampering is most 
acute). 
 132.  Id. at 41–42. 
 133.  Id. at 41 (quoting Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. 617, 631 (1989)). 
 134.  Id. at 43. 
 135.  Id. at 45. 
 136.  Id. at 46–47. 
 137.  Id. 
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c.  The Additional Procedure Would Not Prevent Erroneous 
Deprivations of Assets 
The Kaleys’ interests might outweigh these burdens if there were 
reason to believe that the proposed proceeding would prevent the 
erroneous deprivations of assets.138 In over two decades since the 
Second Circuit authorized these hearings, the Government is unaware 
of a single case in which a district court has disagreed with a grand 
jury determination of probable cause.139 Because probable cause 
requires merely the “fair probability” that the defendant committed 
the crime, this is unsurprising. 
Given the limited utility of these types of proceedings and the 
significant burdens that such proceedings impose on the prosecution, 
the Government argues that the Mathews test tips in its favor. 
VI.  ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court is faced with a vexing, if not uncommon, 
dilemma in Kaley—the conflict of two longstanding principles of 
constitutional law. Both the right to counsel of choice and the 
sacrosanct nature of a grand jury indictment are fundamental to the 
American criminal justice system. As a result, the Court is likely to 
attempt to finesse the line by devising a solution that respects both 
principles. The case will probably split the Court, though not along 
traditional ideological lines. 
A.  Costello and the Inviolability of the Grand Jury 
Drawing on a long line of precedent, the Justices will likely 
emphasize that the grand jury is an important fixture of the American 
criminal justice system whose findings are rarely, if ever, subject to 
collateral attack. The primary divide among the Justices may be 
between those who are willing to allow a limited parallel inquiry into 
probable cause for the underlying charges and those who see such an 
inquiry as an unnecessary and impermissible challenge to the 
conclusive nature of the grand jury indictment. Even those Justices 
that favor a post-restraint hearing will operate under the principle 
that the grand jury’s finding of probable cause is typically beyond 
reproach. No matter how much skepticism about grand juries 
 
 138.  Id. at 47. 
 139.  Id. at 49. 
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pervades the modern academy,140 it is nearly unthinkable that the 
Court would openly question a system that is enshrined in the Bill of 
Rights.141 Even if the independence of the grand jury is a fiction, it is a 
fiction the judiciary has been content to accept for centuries.142 
The Court will not permit a post-indictment hearing that would 
involve direct inquiry into the grand jury proceeding itself. The 
Costello line of cases clearly forecloses peering behind that curtain.143 
The Kaleys argue, however, for something different—an independent, 
adversarial hearing during which a judge would consider whether 
probable cause exists based on the evidence presented at that hearing 
before that judge.144 Though other considerations might counsel 
against such a hearing, Costello and its progeny are readily 
distinguishable. Costello, United States v. Williams,145 and United States 
v. Calandra146 all involved attempts by defendants to pull back the 
curtain and directly challenge the validity of what transpired in the 
grand jury itself.147 In addition, much of the logic underlying the 
Costello line’s refusal to reassess matters considered by the grand jury 
breaks down with the additional consideration of the right to counsel 
of choice. 
Because the deprivation of property needed to retain counsel of 
choice can affect the outcome of trial, Kaley animates concerns that 
were not present in Costello or its progeny. The Court in Williams 
cited Blackstone for the proposition that the procedural protections 
and rules of evidence deemed so fundamental at trial need not apply 
before the grand jury because “the finding of an indictment is only in 
the nature of an enquiry or accusation, which is afterwards to be tried 
and determined.”148 If the grand jury makes a mistake, the defendant 
 
 140.  See generally Kuckes, supra note 108, at 2. 
 141.  See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992) (describing the grand jury as “a 
constitutional fixture in its own right” (citation omitted)). 
 142.  Id. (“[T]he whole theory of [the grand jury’s] function is that it belongs to no branch of 
the institutional Government, serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government 
and the people.”). 
 143.  Id. at 49 (“Over the years, we have received many requests to exercise supervision 
over the grand jury's evidence-taking process, but we have refused them all . . . .”). 
 144.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 12. 
 145.  504 U.S. 36 (1992). 
 146.  414 U.S. 338 (1974). 
 147.  Williams, 504 U.S. at 51 (noting that the prosecutor is under no obligation to present 
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343 (permitting presentation of 
evidence to the grand jury that was obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment); Costello v. 
United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1962) (permitting presentation of hearsay to the grand jury).  
 148.  Williams, 504 U.S. at 51 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 300 
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will have the opportunity to be vindicated at trial where all the 
familiar protections apply.149 The purpose of trial is to get at the truth. 
As long as the trial is fair, all’s well that ends well. This logic works 
when the question is merely about the admission of hearsay or the 
exclusion of exculpatory evidence before the grand jury. Whether the 
grand jury bases its indictment on hearsay will not change the 
outcome of the trial because hearsay evidence will not be admitted at 
the trial itself. The logic breaks down, however, when the grand jury’s 
finding of probable cause is used not only to compel the defendant to 
stand trial, but also to restrict the defendant’s right to counsel of 
choice. Interference with the right to counsel of choice can change the 
dynamic and ultimate outcome of the trial. To use Blackstone’s terms, 
the grand jury’s “inquiry and accusation” functions are being used to 
prejudice the “determination” function of trial. In light of these 
considerations, asset forfeiture requires additional procedural 
safeguards. 
B. To an Indicted Defendant, the Right to Counsel of Choice Is 
Uniquely Important 
For an indicted defendant, the right to counsel of choice could be 
the right on which all others depend. Though impossible to quantify, 
an experienced lawyer with time to devote to the case may have a 
greater ability to mount a full and complete defense, giving the 
defendant the greatest possible chance to avoid a complete loss of 
liberty or, in capital cases, even life. And, regardless of merit or skill, 
the Court has recognized the importance of a defendant’s qualified 
right to choose her counsel. 
Although other rights may be temporarily suspended pretrial, the 
defendant’s right to counsel of choice is undermined if she cannot 
exercise the right while it matters. The temporary deprivation of the 
right to property will lead to an immediate deprivation of the right to 
counsel of choice, potentially increasing the likelihood that the 
defendant will suffer a permanent loss of liberty. This is simply not the 
case with other rights to which the Government seeks to draw 
analogies.150 A defendant whose assets are restrained may not 
presently be able to, for example, make a pilgrimage she believes is 
 
(1769)). 
 149.  See id. (“It is axiomatic that the grand jury sits not to determine guilt or innocence, but 
to assess whether there is adequate basis for bringing a criminal charge.”). 
 150.  See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 24. 
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necessary to practice her religion. But this temporary deprivation will 
not increase the probability she will be incarcerated, and thereby 
permanently deprived of her liberty. 
Even so, the Court in Caplin & Drysdale leaned heavily on the 
logic that the right to counsel is just one right among many.151 In this 
vein, Justice Scalia inquired of the Kaleys’ counsel how it could be 
unconstitutional to restrain the defendant’s property pending trial 
based on the grand jury indictment, when it is constitutional to 
restrain her liberty and hold her pending trial on that basis.152 
However, Chief Justice Roberts observed: “It’s not that property is 
more valuable than liberty . . . . It’s that the property can be used to 
hire a lawyer who can keep h[er] out of jail.”153 Robert’s basic logic 
should win out on this point. There may be no “hierarchy among[] 
constitutional rights”154 in an abstract sense, but there is little question 
that to a defendant awaiting trial, the right to counsel of choice is 
paramount.155 
C.  Will it Make Any Difference? 
Five circuit courts currently permit hearings of the type for which 
the Kaleys advocate,156 but it is unclear how this fact will weigh with 
the Court. On the one hand, there is now empirical evidence that 
judges rarely, if ever, release assets based on finding at an 
independent hearing that there is no probable cause for the 
underlying charges.157 On the other hand, five circuits have used this 
procedure and federal prosecutions have continued, seemingly 
unabated.158 Perhaps both sides have exaggerated the likely effect of 
such a hearing. 
Reports from the Second Circuit indicate that although judges are 
unlikely to order the release of assets at a post-indictment hearing, 
the looming possibility of a hearing strengthens a defendant’s position 
in negotiations with the prosecution over the status of assets needed 
to retain counsel of choice. Since Monsanto III, district-level judges in 
the Second Circuit have presided over twenty-five hearings of the 
 
 151.  See supra text accompanying notes 60–62. 
 152.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 3–4. 
 153.  Id. at 24–25. 
 154.  Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. 617, 628 (1989). 
 155.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 24. 
 156.  See supra note 73. See also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 8. 
 157.  Brief for the United States, supra note 81, at 15. 
 158.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 72, at 23.  
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type the Kaleys seek. None of the hearings resulted in a district court 
ruling that there was no probable cause for the indictment and that, as 
a result, assets needed to retain counsel of choice should be 
released.159 
Chief Justice Roberts, however, took issue with the Government’s 
claim that these statistics indicated that the hearings made no 
difference.160 It is likely, he reasoned, that the possibility of the hearing 
discourages prosecutors from seeking forfeiture of assets that might 
be subject to release at such a hearing.161 If probable cause is tenuous, 
the prosecutors may determine that the hearing is not worth the 
effort or risk. Likewise, counsel for the Kaleys pointed to an amicus 
brief detailing how the Second Circuit rule had resulted in several 
“courthouse steps” agreements between prosecutors and defense 
counsel on the issue of restraining assets needed to retain counsel.162 
As the Court has observed in the context of plea-bargaining, most of 
the work of modern federal criminal prosecution is done through 
informal negotiations.163 That practical reality, however, in no way 
indicates that the formalized procedural rules are insignificant. Parties 
negotiate in the shadow of the law that they know will be invoked if 
negotiations break down. The Court will likely recognize, then, that 
statistics about the outcome of formalized proceedings tell only a 
sliver of the full story in this context, particularly with so little data 
available. 
D.  Asset Forfeiture and Healthy Judicial Skepticism of Government 
Motives 
One reason that Kaley has received a moderate amount of media 
attention is that asset forfeiture has slowly crept into the public view 
in recent years and become increasingly controversial.164 Most of the 
 
 159.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 36. 
 160.  Id. at 16. 
 161.  Id. at 37. 
 162.  Id. at 16; Brief of New York Council of Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Petitioner at 8–9, United States v. Kaley, 133 S. Ct. 1580 (2013) (No. 12-464). 
 163.  Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (“[P]lea bargaining . . . is not some 
adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.” (quoting Robert Scott & 
William Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L. J. 1909, 1912 (1992)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 164.  See, e.g., MARIAN R. WILLIAMS ET AL., POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL 
ASSET FORFEITURE (Institute for Justice Report 2010), available at http://www.ij.org/policing-
for-profit-the-abuse-of-civil-asset-forfeiture-4; Sarah Stillman, Taken, THE NEW YORKER (Aug. 
12, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/08/12/130812fa_fact_stillman. 
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attention has been on civil asset forfeiture, under which the 
government may seize property in the absence of an indictment or 
even an arrest.165 Many of the same concerns about due process that 
animate concern about civil asset forfeiture—the presumption of 
innocence, perverse incentives, and abuse of the criminal justice 
system—also apply to freezing funds subject to criminal forfeiture 
prior to conviction. In cases like this one, there is the added concern 
that prosecutors may seek forfeiture to dismiss a particularly zealous 
or effective defense attorney.166 In seeking the broadest possible scope 
for forfeiture, the prosecutor has nothing to lose and everything to 
gain.167 
In Good, the Court noted the potential perverse incentives 
created by forfeiture, concluding that more searching judicial analysis 
is appropriate when the government has a direct pecuniary interest in 
the outcome of its law enforcement action.168 Justice Breyer seemed to 
channel this skepticism about government motivations when he 
pressed the Assistant Solicitor General about the percentage of 
forfeiture funds actually allocated to victims of crime.169 While 
insisting that paying restitution to victims is one of the government’s 
central goals in seeking asset forfeiture, the Assistant Solicitor 
General conceded that about five to ten percent of forfeiture funds 
are likely allocated to this purpose.170 
The sympathetic facts of Kaley may also help to elicit this more 
searching judicial analysis. After all, freezing assets may make sense in 
the context of insider trading, racketeering, and organized crime. It 
makes less sense for couples that sell—or allegedly steal—medical 
devices. 
 
 
 
 
 165.  See, e.g., Stillman, supra note 164. 
 166.  See Brief for Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae, supra note 105, at 13–14; Kaley I, 579 
F.3d 1246, 1266 (11th Cir. 2009) (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (“A prosecutor has everything to gain 
by restraining assets that ultimately may not be forfeited. By doing so, he can stack the deck in 
the government's favor by crippling the defendant's ability to afford high-quality counsel.”). 
 167.  Kaley I, 579 F.3d at 1266. 
 168.  United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 55–56 (1993). 
 169.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 42–43. 
 170.  Id. at 43. 
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E.  Likely Disposition 
It is likely that a narrowly divided court will hold that defendants 
in the Kaleys’ position are entitled to a pretrial, post-restraint 
adversarial hearing at which they may contest the issue of probable 
cause for the underlying indictment. 
A slight majority of the Court, including Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Breyer, will reason, in line with the Second Circuit’s opinion in 
Monsanto IV, that such a hearing would satisfy the due process rights 
of a defendant who needs restrained assets to retain counsel of choice. 
Such a hearing would not conflict with Costello because it would not 
require pulling back the curtain on grand jury proceedings. At such a 
hearing, the government might choose to present different evidence 
than it did at the grand jury proceeding, and the defense will be able 
to present exculpatory evidence. The hearing, then, would take place 
at a different time, with a different purpose, and with different 
evidence presented. If the judge ultimately allows the release of funds, 
she would do so on the grounds that the evidence presented at that 
hearing did not establish probable cause sufficient to justify continued 
asset restraint. There would be no inquiry into whether the grand jury, 
in light of the evidence before the grand jury, properly found probable 
cause. The grand jury’s indictment, then, would still be a perfectly 
valid instrument for compelling the defendant to stand trial on the 
charges alleged. 
A second group, perhaps including Justices Scalia and Ginsburg, 
will likely dissent from the holding that due process requires a post-
restraint, pretrial adversarial hearing under the circumstances. This 
group could rely on the history of the grand jury’s role in American 
criminal law and the Costello line of cases. They may argue that the 
grand jury’s finding of probable cause has long been considered 
sufficient to deprive the defendant of a variety of rights pending trial. 
They also may warn that exposing the grand jury to criticism or 
contradiction, even indirectly, is opening a proverbial can of worms. 
Further, they may argue that denying defendants an opportunity to 
challenge probable cause at a hearing does not violate due process by 
drawing from the Court’s opinion in Medina.171 If the inviolability of 
 
 171.  See id. at 9 (Scalia, J., seemingly channeling Medina in suggesting that “it’s hard to say 
that [the ex-parte nature of the grand jury proceeding] violates . . . our concept of fundamental 
fairness”). Because Medina is arguably limited to state criminal procedure cases in which 
federalism concerns are implicated, this dissenting group may draw upon the language of 
Medina, without holding that Medina controls. 
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the grand jury’s determination of probable cause is itself deeply 
rooted in American traditions and a sense of justice, there is no way 
that denying a defendant the opportunity to challenge the grand 
jury’s probable cause determination violates that sense of justice. 
Finally, the dissenting Justices may emphasize the anomalies and 
further due process challenges which a ruling for the Kaleys would 
invite.172 
As an unlikely alternative, the Court could decide to overrule 
Caplin & Drysdale entirely and hold that asset forfeiture simply 
cannot constitutionally reach funds a defendant needs to retain 
counsel of choice. Justice Scalia even offered some off-the-cuff praise 
for this approach, given its simplicity and clarity.173 This approach 
would have several advantages.  First, it would be easy to administer.  
Second, it would avoid entirely the morass of second-guessing the 
grand jury.  And third, it would provide the most vigorous protection 
for the right to counsel of choice. With some of the blunt assets-are-
guilty-until-proven-innocent logic of Caplin & Drysdale eliminated, 
more defendants could retain counsel with their own funds, easing 
pressure on an overburdened public defender system. This approach, 
however, would broadly contravene the intent of Congress in passing 
21 U.S.C. § 853 and could inflate the right to counsel of choice beyond 
its “qualified” status. Even libertarian organizations like the Cato 
Institute and the Institute for Justice did not dare dream so big as to 
argue for overruling Caplin & Drysdale in their briefs.174 Thus, this 
approach is unlikely to garner a single vote. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court will likely find a special carve-out of the 
broader asset forfeiture regime in Kaley. Kaley’s most lasting impact, 
however, may be in raising awareness about forfeiture policies that 
will then prompt action in Congress. Congress is where clean, 
equitable solutions could be crafted to allow defendants controlled 
 
 172.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 9 (Ginsburg, J. noting the anomaly of 
allowing a judge to preside over a trial after he has determined that there is no probable cause 
for the underlying charges); id. at 14 (Scalia, J. stating “the next case we have, if we agree with 
you, will be somebody saying due process does not allow you to proceed with a trial when it has 
been found by an impartial judge that there is no probable cause”). 
 173.  Id. at 14. 
 174.  See generally Brief of Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae, supra note 105; Brief of the 
Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae, United States v. Kaley, 133 S. Ct. 1580 (2013) (No. 12-
462). 
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access to personal funds needed to retain counsel. Congress has 
previously acted to reform civil asset forfeiture, and could now act to 
reform the intersection of forfeiture and the right to counsel of 
choice. 
Federal criminal defendants must confront the United States 
government, the most powerful organization in history.175 In this battle 
of Goliath v. David, is it too much to ask that David be allowed to 
keep his own sling? 
 
 
 175.  Ilya Shapiro et al., Legal Briefs: Kaley v. United States, CATO INST. (July 1, 2013), 
http://www.cato.org/publications/legal-briefs/kaley-v-united-states. 
